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Abstract

An extensive literature that examines the relationship between family structure and children’s

outcomes consistently shows that living with a single parent is associated with negative outcomes. Few

studies, however, directly test the relationship between family structure and outcomes for the child once

he/she reaches adulthood. We directly examine, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, whether family
structure during childhood is related to the child’s economic wellbeing both during childhood as well as

adulthood. Our findings suggest that the economic wellbeing of children of mothers who experience a marital
dissolution and remarry are no different from the children of mothers who are continuously married.

However, the children of mothers whose marriages dissolve but who do not remarry experience large
declines in their income over their first ten years of life. We also show that while the children of never
married mothers earn a lot less as adults than the children of married parents, these differences can largely
be explained by demographic and socioeconomic factors. Finally, our findings suggest that children who have
mothers who experience a marital dissolution and who do not remarry have economic losses that persist into
adulthood. Robustness checks using family fixed effects models support this result.
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Introduction
The importance of family structure as it relates to outcomes for U.S. children is one of the
most frequently investigated topics in the field of social demography. Descriptively, it is
clear that children who live with married parents fare better in nearly all domains, e.g.,

economically, cognitively, and emotionally, than those with parents who separate or

divorce during their childhood or who live with a parent who was never married (Amato
2000; Bjorklund, Ginther, and Sundstrom 2001; Gruber 2004; McLanahan and Sandefur

1994; Nock 2000; Ribar 2004). These differences persist even after controlling for a variety
of demographic and socioeconomic factors (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Ribar 2004).
Most research to date examines the relationship between family structure and outcomes

measured during the child’s youth and adolescence, such as educational attainment (e.g.,
Astone and McLanahan 1991, 1994; Biblarz and Raftery 1999; McLanahan and Sandefur
1994), cognitive test scores (Gennetian 2005) and psychological distress and smoking

(Ermisch and Francesconi 2001). Many of these outcomes are chosen because they are
considered indicators of the child’s success as an adult. However, these studies do not

directly test the relationship between the family structure of a child’s parents during the
child’s youth and outcomes for the child once he/she reaches adulthood, and there is

relatively little research on the long-term impacts of family structure (Fronstin, Greenberg,
and Robins 2001). The contribution of this paper is to examine directly whether the

economic wellbeing of children during both their youth and in their adulthood is related to
their family structure during their formative years. Single parenthood might alter the

financial wellbeing of a child’s family, which, in turn, could potentially reduce the human
capital accumulation of the child and his/her financial success as an adult and a parent.
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Ultimately then, family structure may play a large role in the economic success of a family

across generations.

This paper adds to extant literature on family structure and children’s outcomes in

the United States in several important ways. First, we use a data source, the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), that allows us to link the resources available to a child while

growing up to the economic success of the same child once he/she becomes an adult. As

mentioned earlier, nearly all of the previous work in this area investigated family structure

and outcomes for children while they were young or during adolescence as these outcomes
had less strenuous data requirements. It is only now that a single data source with

information on family structure over several decades exists; one that allows an inquiry into

economic wellbeing in both the child’s youth and adulthood. Second, much of the previous
literature on family structure and children’s outcomes was based on the living

arrangements of the child during a particular year of the child’s life. For example, in their
classic study, McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) define the family structure for the child
based on the mother’s marital status in the child’s 16th year. Wolfe et al. (1996)

demonstrate that choosing a single point in time to capture family circumstances often

produces misleading results. In this study, we create a family structure history for each

child from birth through the year of their 10th birthday. While we follow McLanahan and

Sandefur and define single parenthood as living with a divorced, separated, never married,
or widowed mother, we do not base our classification on one year of the child’s life.

Instead, we use the entire 10-year interval to determine if the child grew up with a single

mother. Thus, we are much more likely to classify children as living with an ever-divorced

mother, for example, than we would using a single year of data.
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There are several well-known limitations to the literature on family structure and

children’s outcomes. Family structure is not randomly assigned; therefore, it is

extraordinarily difficult to establish causal estimates of the impact of single parenthood. In

addition to capturing causal impacts, statistical associations between family structure and
children’s outcomes could easily result from reverse causality, also frequently called
simultaneity. These associations also potentially contain bias generated by omitted

variables (Bjorkland, Ginther, and Sundstrom 2007; Ribar 2004). Simultaneity bias exists
because many estimates of the relationship between family structure and an outcome,

particularly cross-sectional estimates, potentially include the outcome’s effect on family
structure. In addition, it has been well-established that single parenthood is associated

with a number of characteristics that might affect family income. If one fails to account for

these omitted variables, then estimates of the effect of family structure will also include the

indirect effect of family structure that operates through these omitted variables. These
problems rightly leave the literature on family structure and children’s outcomes

vulnerable to criticisms that the estimates are biased. Without a controlled experiment that
randomly assigns family structure, establishing causal estimates is exceedingly difficult.
We also can be questioned on whether our estimates truly capture single

parenthood’s effect on family income (i.e., a causal impact) because of simultaneity and

omitted variable bias. However, we take several steps to address these issues, largely by

taking advantage of the information we have over nearly four decades. We use a difference
model to remove the bias created by time-invariant omitted variables correlated with

family structure and family income during the parents’ generation. We also benefit from
estimating the importance of family structure several decades before the child’s adult
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income is measured reducing concerns for simultaneity bias. In addition, we use family
fixed effects to test the robustness of our findings for the relationship between family
structure and the child’s economic success as an adult.

While the econometric challenges that have only been partially addressed in the

literature are important to document so as to improve our current understanding of the
issue, it is equally important to note that policymakers in the United States continue to

place great emphasis on marriage, particularly for the low-income population. One can see

this in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program where the goals
include promoting healthy marriages and discouraging out-of-wedlock pregnancies.

Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana have implemented laws that create a covenant marriage

option for couples. Covenant marriages require counseling before a couple can divorce and
a no-fault declaration is not an option for dissolution. Thus, while it can be difficult to
generate causal estimates of the impact of family structure on children’s outcomes, it
remains an important social policy topic and is, therefore, worthy of more scholarly
attention.

We contribute several findings to the research literature. First, we find that marital

dissolution in and of itself does not reduce the economic resources available to children.

Instead, we find that those who remarry after dissolution are not different in terms of their
mean income over the first ten years of a child’s life from those who are always married.
The children of parents whose marriages dissolve and who do not remarry, however,

experience large declines in their mean income over the first ten years of a child’s life.

Second, we show that while the children of never married mothers earn a lot less as adults
than the children of married parents, these differences can largely be explained by
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demographic and socioeconomic factors. Third, our findings suggest that children who

have parents who experience a marital dissolution in the first ten years of their life earn

less income in their adulthoods. Robustness checks using family fixed effects models are
consistent with this result.
Theory
There are a number of reasons living with a single parent might harm the economic

wellbeing of children. Many of the long-term economic effects of family structure operate
by reducing the child’s human capital accumulation, which would reduce the child’s

productivity as an adult (Becker 1993). Perhaps the most straightforward explanation
involves the differences in resources provided by two parents compared to one. Two

parents likely have more time in a day to distribute between participation in the labor force
and the supervision of children. We know that married parents have higher average family
incomes than single parents (Duncan and Hoffman 1985; Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins
2001; Ribar 2004). All else equal, this would allow for greater investments in schooling,

educational technology, and extracurricular lessons, among many other things and this
should ultimately translate into a higher standard of living for the child (Becker 1991;

Becker and Tomes 1986). Furthermore, married parents should have more time (between
the two of them) to spend with their children than single parents, all else equal (Fronstin,

Greenberg, and Robins 2001). Economic models of specialization suggest that two parents
can capitalize on their comparative advantages and create greater productivity than could

a single parent (Becker 1991). Two parents co-residing also experience economies of scale.
The couple can pool their resources and can share the cost of housing, appliances, and

5

many of other expenditures that do not need to be duplicated for a family (McLanahan and

Sandefur 1994; Ribar 2004). Furthermore, should a couple split, women and children tend
to receive less than their proportionate share of the couple’s pooled resources. In other

words, a mother and a child usually have to live on less than two-thirds of the pooled
resources available to the family (of three) (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). This

reduction in resources may translate into lower levels of parental investment in the child’s
human capital as the custodial parent must split her time between the labor force and
home production (Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins 2001).

Divorce, separation, or the death of a spouse can produce inordinate amounts of

stress that might harm the child’s economic wellbeing (Amato 2000; Fronstin, Greenberg,
and Robins 2001). Because a divorce is culmination of a process of marital disintegration
that can transpire over many years and produces stress throughout that period, it can

affect the emotional and physical development of children. This stress in turn can disrupt

their educational attainment and the developmental process (Amato 2000; McLanahan and

Sandefur 1994). Parents/fathers who do not live in the same household also do not develop

the same trust levels and commitment to their children (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994).
Children who reside in single-parent households may also assume adult roles, such as

providing childcare for younger siblings which could slow human capital accumulation
(Weiss 1979). The stresses created by single motherhood, whether it occurs through
marital dissolution or never having been married, can also strain the mother child

relationship. This might lead to inconsistent parenting and may disrupt the natural stages

children progress through in their development (McLanahan 1988; McLanahan and

Bumpass 1988).
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Of course, if children are in a difficult situation at home, for instance, one where

there is physical or emotional abuse, removing the child from such a circumstance might

prove beneficial (Amato 2000; Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins 2001; Gruber 2004). Even
in households in which abuse is not present, continual marital turmoil can be harmful to
the child’s emotional wellbeing and create economic effects. It is also true that the

reduction in resources created when a parent leaves the child’s household is moderated by
the reduction in their consumption (Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins 2001).
Literature Review
While the empirical research on family structure and its effects on children’s outcomes is
quite large, there are only a handful of studies that investigate the relationship between

family structure and the child’s outcomes once he/she reaches adulthood, including a few

international studies. Fronstin, Greenberg, and Robins (2001) use the British National Child
Development Survey (NCDS) to determine if the divorce or the death of a father affects

educational attainment, labor force participation, and earnings by age 33. The NCDS is a
panel data set composed of 98 percent (n=17,414) of all children born in the United

Kingdom during the first week of March in 1958. Information on the birth cohort was

collected again when the children were age 7, 11, 16, 23, and 33 (Fronstin, Greenberg, and
Robins 2001). Their findings suggest that parental divorce or death is associated with a

reduction in the labor force participation of males and in the wages of females. Parental
divorce also appears to moderate educational attainment for the British cohort.

Also using data from the United Kingdom, Ermish and Francesconi (2001) use

sibling fixed effects model to determine if single parenthood is related to educational
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attainment, economic inactivity, childbearing at a young age, and smoking. Their data

source is the 1991 to 1995 waves of the British Household Panel Survey. The authors claim
that by using sibling comparisons, they remove all endogenous factors constant within the

family. The authors also use variation with respect to the timing of the single parenthood to
determine if particular periods during the child’s life cycle are particularly damaging to the
child’s outcomes. They find that single parenthood is negatively related to educational

attainment and positively related to smoking. Furthermore, single parenthood during the
child’s youth appears to be particularly harmful.

Gruber (2004) is one of a few studies that investigates the long-term economic

impacts of family structure using data from the United States. Gruber asks if changes in

states’ unilateral divorce laws are related to the economic wellbeing of children as adults.
Unilateral divorce laws allow one party in a marriage to dissolve the marriage without

asking for the consent of the other spouse, and he finds that children exposed to unilateral
divorce regimes while growing up have lower levels of education and family income as
adults.

In a study similar to this one, Bjorklund, Ginther, and Sundstrom (2007) use both

the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort (NLSY) and the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate the relationship between family structure and

educational attainment and earnings for American families and a 20 percent random

sample of individuals born in Sweden in 1964 and 1965, matching them with their siblings.
Their findings suggest that the children of single parent families have lower educational

attainment and earnings. However, once one removes within family variation, the results

are no longer statistically significant. Unlike our study, they only use one year of earnings,
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however. In addition, Bjorklund, Ginther, and Sundstrom (2007) measure the amount of

time in the child’s first 16 years that the child spent in a variety of family structures as their
independent variables of interest. These family structure measures assume linearity in the
amount of time spent in the different structures.
Methods
Data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) serves as the data source for this analysis. The
PSID is a longitudinal data set originally representative of households in the United States
in 1968, the year the survey started. From 1968 through 1993, respondents were asked

demographic and employment questions annually, and since 1993, respondents have been

interviewed biannually. One of the unique features of the PSID is that children of the

original 4,802 sample members were retained in the sample after they left their parents’

households. 1 This attribute allows one to follow a child over time thereby comparing the
child’s economic circumstances in childhood to his/her economic wellbeing as an adult.
We selected a sample of children born between 1967 and 1978 to the original

sample members, and collected information on them between their birth and age nine and
again from 2000 to 2008, when they were adults. 2 We follow Ermish and Francesconi

(2001) and assume that children reside with their mothers during their childhood.

Therefore, using the Marital History Supplement in the PSID, we also track the marital
1

The PSID is composed of two independent samples. The first, called the Survey Research Center or SRC, sample
is composed of a randomly drawn national sample, and the second, called the Survey of Economic Opportunities or
SEO, is a group of low-income families. We use both sub-samples in our analyses, and weight responses by the
individual weights provided. See Hill (1992) for more details on the PSID sample design.
2
As detailed below, we used a number of selection criteria to create our analytic sample, which altered its
composition slightly. Please see the data appendix for more details.
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history of each child’s mother beginning in the year of the child’s birth through the year of
the child’s ninth birthday. 3 Mothers are classified as always married, never married,

married after the birth of the child, or married at the birth but subsequently experiencing a
marital dissolution. Those in the dissolution category include mothers who separated,

divorced, or became a widow. Among this group, we further divided them into those who

had a marital dissolution and remarried between the child’s birth and age nine and those
who never remarried during that interval.

Table 1 provides information on our analytic sample. Eighty percent of the children

had mothers who were continuously married throughout their first ten years. The mothers

of 3.4 percent were never married and just over five percent married after the birth of their
child. Of the mothers in the analytic sample, 11.4 percent were married when their child

was born but experienced a dissolution during the next ten years. This last set of mothers

can be separated into those that remarry (3.6 percent of total sample) and those that never
remarried (7.8 percent of total sample).

For each child, we estimate the child’s total family income at two points in time.

First, we create a measure of the child’s “permanent income when a child,” which we define
as the average of the total family income in each year between the child’s birth and ninth
birthday. Total family income includes taxable income, such as earnings, interest, and

dividends, and cash transfers, such as Social Security and welfare from all family members.

All income figures are inflated to 2008 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 and the CPI-U-RS and are
3

Theoretically, one would prefer to investigate family structure throughout the period when a child resides with
his/her parent(s). One could then determine if there are ages when single parenthood is particularly impactful. We
are constrained to some extent by the fact that we want to measure the family income both when the child was
young and when the child became an adult, and the length of the panel is limited. We believe we have captured the
period in a child’s life that is most likely influenced by family structure. Ermish and Francesconi (2001) show that it
is the family structure early in a child’s life that is most highly correlated with adverse outcomes.
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based on the mother’s family. We measure permanent income in childhood using the

average of family income over the first ten years of the child’s life because the research
literature has shown that annual measures of income have considerable year-to-year

variation due to the transitory component of income (Corak 2001; Mayer and Lopoo 2008;

Solon 1992). Moreover, we look at the first 10 years because these are the ages when the
parents are making decisions regarding the child’s early human capital formation. The
mother must have at least three years of income to remain in the sample.

We estimate the child’s permanent income as an adult as the average of the total

family income for the child between 2000 and 2008, a period when the child has reached

adulthood (and potentially is investing in his/her children). We require that the child have

three years of income during that period before retaining the child in the analytic sample.
Because the children in our sample are of different ages over this period, we flexibly
control for child’s age in all analyses using this measure.

In addition to reporting total family income, we also use a family income measure

adjusted for the size of the family. We follow the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

methodology and divide the total family income for the child by the square root of the

family size for each year (see CBO 2009). We then take the mean of family income adjusted

for family size. The square root of family size is used to allow for the economies of scale

present in a family. Table 1 shows that the mean annual income for these children during
the first ten years was $60,315 and the median was $54,870. Adjusted for family size, the

mean family income was $29,684 and the median was $27,269. Once the children became

adults, the mean annual income was $81,256 and the median was $69,102. Once adjusted

for family size the mean income was $50,630 and the median was $42,124.
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Empirical Strategy
Family Income in Childhood

We begin our analyses by comparing the results from children who resided with mothers

who were continuously married throughout the child’s formative years to children whose

mothers were not, a group we classify as single mothers. This simple definition is one that

has been used in several analyses in the past. To gain greater insight into the heterogeneity
among single mother families, we also report results splitting the single mother group into
those who were never married, those who were not married at the child’s birth, but
subsequently married, and those who were married at the child’s birth but later

experienced a marital dissolution. Mothers who experience a dissolution do not necessarily
remain single; therefore, we will further separate the last group into those who remarried
during the child’s first ten years and those that did not remarry during the ten years.

In our analysis of the relationship between family structure and permanent income

during childhood, we first estimate the following descriptive model:
1)

𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐹𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖 ,

where Y represents the permanent income during childhood for child i and FS represents

the family structure for the child during his/her first ten years. If we simply define FS as an
indicator variable equal to one if the mother is a single parent, then α0 is the permanent
income for children who resided with parents who were always married, and α1 is the

difference in the permanent income for those who resided with single parents at some
point during their first decade. We also report estimates with the more elaborate
specification for family structure described above.
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In addition to these descriptive findings comparing the permanent income of the

child during childhood by family structure, we also estimate models that include several

demographic controls, including an indicator variable if the child is female, two indicator
variables for the child’s race (African American and other non-White), and a linear and

quadratic term for the mother’s age averaged over the years in which total family income

was measured. We also include a variable for the age of the mother when she had her first
child. Research consistently shows that young maternal age is positively associated with
low socioeconomic status (Geronimus 1987; Geronimus and Korenman 1992). We also

control for the socioeconomic status of the family using a set of indicator variables for the

mother’s education level. This set of mutually exclusive variables includes an indicator set

to one if the mother did not complete high school, a second if her highest educational

attainment was high school completion, and a third if she completed some college. The
omitted category is mothers who completed college (and higher levels of education).

The results for equation 1 are potentially biased due to the same selection issues

that plague virtually all of the family structure literature. One might reasonably ask if the

mothers whose marriages dissolve have different levels of permanent income because of
the dissolution and the loss of a coresident adult in the labor force, or if those with low-

levels of income are more likely to experience dissolution. The permanent income measure
and the mother’s family structure are measured during the same interval making it

impossible to determine the causal direction. Furthermore, it is well understood that single
parents are quite different from parents who are always married in many ways other than
their family structure.
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To remove some of the biases present in this first set of results, we make several

modifications in subsequent analyses. First, we use a more homogeneous group of families

than those in the complete analytic sample. More specifically, were retain only the mothers
who were married at the birth of the child. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for several
variables by family structure type. The mothers who were always married and those who

experienced marital dissolution are more similar in terms of observable characteristics to
one another than those who were never married or who married after the birth of the

child, although they are far from homogeneous. It is likely, therefore, that they are also

more similar in terms of unobservables. For instance, just over 8 percent of the children of
continuously married mothers, 9.5 percent among the children of mothers who

experienced dissolution and remarried, and 23.8 percent of the children of parents who
experienced a dissolution and did not remarry were African American. Compare these
numbers to 80 percent of those who were never married and 41 percent of those who
married after the birth who are African American. One observes similar differences in
terms of education. Among the always married mothers, 16.2 percent had a college

education, while nearly 20 percent of the children of mothers who remarried and 18

percent of the mothers who had a marital dissolution without remarriage completed

college. In contrast, only 2.6 percent of the mothers who never-married and 1.6 percent of
the mothers who married after birth completed college. While there is still considerable

variation among the mothers who were married at the birth of the child, by using a more

homogeneous comparison, we hope to remove some of the biases created by unobserved
heterogeneity.
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We also use a difference model to ask if the mean total family income before the

dissolution occurred is different from the mean total family income after the dissolution.

Naturally, one should expect the total family income to increase as the workers in a family

gain greater experience and their earnings increase. To provide a baseline comparison, i.e.,
to define what is a reasonable change in income over time, we utilize the results from the
always married group. To create this counterfactual change among the always married

group, one that clearly never experienced dissolution, we compare the mean income in the

first six years of the child’s life to the mean income in the last four. We chose year six as the
dividing point since the median year that a dissolution occurred (among those who

experienced it) was the sixth year. We also remove the influence of time invariant factors
by estimating a difference model. Using the set of mothers who were married in the year

their child was born, we estimate the change in the mean income as a function of the family
structure of the child. Consider equation 2a:
2a)

𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,

where t =1 in the period before dissolution and t = 2, post-dissolution. Each observation
has a family specific fixed effect, ε, which is correlated to family structure. We do not

include a constant; therefore, all of the parameter estimates represent mean values for the
individual family structure categories. If one subtracts the income level in the post period
from pre period, one generates the following difference model:
2b)

∆𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽1 ∆𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛥𝑢𝑖 ,

where ΔY represents the difference in mean income before and after the dissolution, ∆𝐴𝑀

represents the artificial change we created before and after the sixth year of marriage, and
∆𝑅𝑒𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑚 are changes in the marital status of the mothers. Because all of the
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mothers started the period married, these changes all represent changes to a nonmarried
state. The benefit of this difference model is that factors that are constant within the 10year interval, such as the mother’s socioeconomic status, preferences for a large family,

marriage, or work, (i.e., ε) are differenced out. In other words, mother specific factors that

are constant within the interval, whether observed or not, are not the explanation for any
differences observed.

Family Income in Adulthood

In our second set of analytic models, we estimate the relationship between family structure
in the child’s first decade and the child’s educational attainment and permanent income as
an adult (described in equation 3). While we do not interpret our results as causal, they
should not suffer from simultaneity bias given the lag between the family structure
measure and the child’s economic status.
3) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐹𝑆𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖

We estimate the relationship between the child’s family structure and the child’s

educational attainment measured as the maximum number of years completed between
2000 and 2008 and the child’s permanent family income as an adult. In addition to the

specification described in equation 3, we add controls for the sex of the child, the child’s

race, a linear and quadratic term for the mother’s age when her income was measured, a
linear and quadratic term for the child’s age when the child’s education and income was

measured, the mother’s age at first birth, and the same set of maternal education indicator
variables used in the first model.
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We also report results comparing the education and permanent family income

measures using variation in family structure for siblings. The advantage of these within

mother or family fixed effects models is that any factor that is constant across siblings, such
as the home environment or school quality, does not bias estimates of the family structure
effect. The utility of these family fixed effects models depends on several factors, however.

First, in order to identify family structure effects, one needs both a large sample of siblings

and variation in both the family structure and the outcome. Second, one has to assume that
individual specific characteristics of the child are not causally related to the changes in
family structure observed. For instance, if families with children who suffer from

developmental disabilities are more likely to divorce, the different level of permanent

income observed for a child with the developmental disability (once an adult) and his/her

sibling without the disability should be attributed to the disability not family structure.
Third and finally, under most circumstances a decision to divorce or separate is the

culmination of a long process in which the couple (or a spouse within the couple) decides

to dissolve the marriage. While we know the date the marriage legally ended, the instability
of the couple, the stress from the breaking relationship, as well as a number of other factors
could affect children for several years before the actual split. If true, while the siblings may
literally live in different family structures during their first ten years, they may have

experienced very similar circumstances. For example, a child whose mother who divorces

when he is 11 would be, in our measure, classified as having an always married mother. His
sibling who is three years younger would be classified as having a mother who had a

marital dissolution. However, if the process of and stress associated with dissolution began
many years prior to the dissolution, the actual differences in the experiences of the two
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siblings may not be large. Given these caveats, we treat the family fixed effects models as
robustness checks on the results we find with the OLS models.

For all of the aforementioned analyses, we report results using both the permanent

family income and results using permanent family income adjusted for the size of the

family. All of the models are also estimated using the individual weights provided by the
PSID. In models with controls, we demean the control variables to give the constant an

interpretation that is relevant for our purposes. We report Huber White standard errors

and because multiple children from the same family are present in the analytic sample, we
adjust the standard errors to allow for dependence in the error term within the same

families.
Results

Family Structure and Economic Resources during Childhood

Table 3 shows descriptive results illustrating the relationship between the child’s family

structure during his/her youth and the parent’s total family income. Model 1 suggests that

children whose mothers were not continuously married have incomes that are $22,000 less

than the children of mothers who were continuously married. Given that always married

families earned about $64,700 annually, single parents have total family incomes that are

about 2/3 the size of always married couples’ incomes. Model 2 breaks the family structure

up into never married, married after birth, those that experienced dissolution and

remarried and those that experienced a dissolution and did not remarry (the omitted group
is always married). This disaggregation shows that there are differences in the economic

wellbeing of families with different family structures. Compared to those that were always
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married, those who were never married earned about $43,000 less. Those who were not

married at the birth but later married, earned around $27,400 less. When we break marital
dissolution into those mothers who remarried and those who did not, we find a result that

will surface repeatedly throughout our analyses: among those who experience dissolution,
there is a different level of family resources that depends on whether the mother

remarried. Mothers who remarry earn about $4,000 less than those who were always

married, but this difference is not statistically significant. On the other hand, those who do
not remarry have permanent income levels that are more than $18,000 less than the

always married, and this difference is statistically significant. In Model 3, we control for

demographic factors, and we still observe statistically significant differences for never

married mothers, mothers who marry after the birth and married mothers who break up

and never remarry. The children of mothers who remarry have nearly identical permanent
income levels suggesting that remarriage protects children from experiencing potential

parental investment levels that are noticeably different from always married families. In

Model 4, with the mother’s education level controlled, the mothers who marry after birth

and the married mothers who break up and never remarry are different from the mothers
who were always married. The other two single mother categories are not different
statistically.

We find nearly identical results in Table 4 when we make an adjustment for the size

of the family. We will walk through the results in Table 4, but since the results are

substantively the same when one makes family size adjustments as when we use total

family income, we focus on total family income results throughout the remainder of this

paper. In Model 1, we find that single parents earn approximately $9,400 less than married
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parents once the income is adjusted for family size, or about 30 percent less. Model 2

breaks the single parent category up into more specific family structures. Never married
families earn about $20,700 less than always married parents, while those who married

after the birth earn about $12,500 less. Those who remarry earn about $1,900 more than
the always married families, although this difference is not statistically significant. Those

who do not remarry earn about $7,800 less than the always married group. One can explain
a great deal of the differences noted among never married mothers with demographic

controls and the mother’s education level. The difference for the children of never married

mothers declines from $20,700 to around $7,000 with these factors controlled. In addition,
the children of mothers who married after birth do not have a statistically significant

difference in their permanent income nor do the children who have parents who dissolve

and remarry. The children of mothers who experience dissolution and do not remarry

however, have lower permanent income adjusted for family size during their childhood –

about $6,200 less than those who are always married. In sum, the children of mothers who
never marry and who are married at their birth but subsequently break up and do not
remarry are the children who experience economic circumstances that are noticeably
different from the children of mothers who are continuously married.

In Table 5, we remove mothers who were not married in the year their child was

born. In this set of results, we compare the incomes of the child before the dissolution to
the income after the dissolution, again artificially breaking-up the continuously married

couples to provide a baseline for a reasonable change over time. This model has the

additional benefit of removing time-invariant factors for the children that may be biasing
the family structure estimates. The first column report results for total family income.

20

Married couples earn about $12,300 more annually in the last four years of the

child’s formative years than during the first six. Those who remarried earned about

$21,100 more after the dissolution. While both estimates are statistically significantly

different from zero, the difference between the coefficient estimates is not statistically

significant. Those who never remarried earned about $13,500 less after the dissolution
than before, and this result is statistically significantly different from the results for the
always married families. In other words, not only do the children of mothers who

experience a dissolution and do not remarry do worse than the children of continuously

married parents whose dissolution was artificially generated, they are worse off than they

were before the dissolution. Clearly, remarriage appears to be protective, while dissolution
without remarriage substantially lowers the economic well-being of children.

We interpret this set of results to suggest that marital dissolution in and of itself

does not reduce the economic resources available to children: those who remarry after

dissolution are not different in terms of their permanent income than those who are always
married. In fact, they may be better off than those who are always married. However, the
children of parents whose marriages dissolve and who do not remarry, experience large
declines in their permanent income. This may be attributed to dissolution coupled with

some personal or environmental characteristics or simply due to omitted factors from the
model, i.e., selection. What we can say is that dissolution itself is not the explanation.
Family Structure and the Economic Wellbeing of the Child as an Adult

Next, we ask if the family structure differences persist into adulthood. In Table 6, we

estimate the relationship between family structure and the child’s educational attainment,
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measured once the child is an adult. The children of single parents earn 0.8 years less

education than the children of always married parents, who earned 14 years on average.
Model 2 shows that, as was the case for parental income, aggregating all of the single

parents hides the differences that exist across difference family structures. For instance,

the children of mothers who were never married earned 1.6 years less than the children of

mothers who were always married, while the children of the mothers that married after
birth the birth of the child earned about 1.1 years less. The children of parents who

experienced dissolution and remarried have nearly identical education levels as the

children of continuously married mothers. The children of dissolution without remarriage
earned about 0.7 years less, and that difference is statistically significant. In Model 3, we

include controls for demographic factors, and the differences for those who never married
and those who married after birth are reduced appreciably. The difference for never

married mothers declines to about two-thirds of the previous estimated mean difference,
and the difference for children of mothers who married after the birth declines to about
one-third of the previous mean difference. In Model 4, we control for the mother’s
education level, and all of the differences decline again, with the exception for the

difference for the dissolution with remarriage group, and this is the only family structure
type that has a statistically significantly difference compared to the children of

continuously married mothers. In Model 5, we include a measure of the child’s permanent

family income to test if the remaining educational difference for this family structure group
can be explained by the permanent family income differences. While the coefficient

estimate falls, the difference persists and remains statistically significant, suggesting that
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the educational differences observed are due to factors other than those generated by
difference in potential parental investment.

In Table 7, we report results for the permanent income of the child as an adult, and

in Table 8, we report estimates for adjusted family income. We focus on the results in Table

7 since the two sets are similar. Model 1 shows that the children of single parents earn

$28,200 less than the children of always married parents, who earn $86,900 on average.

Again, these difference are not equal across family structure types. Models 2 reveals that
the children of mothers who were never married earn $46,000 less than the children of
continuously married mothers, while the children of those who marry after birth earn

$34,500 less. As was the case for income during childhood, there are interesting

differences among the children of dissolution that differ by the remarriage status of the

child’s mother. The children of mothers who remarried earn roughly the same amount as

the children of always married parents, while the children of mothers who do not remarry

earn $30,500 less, a statistically significant difference. Demographic factors explain a large
portion of the differences observed. The difference for never married mothers falls (in

magnitude) from -$46,000 to around -$16,900. The difference for those married after the
birth of the child falls from -$34,000 to -$14,600 and is no longer statistically significant.

The difference for the dissolved but never remarried group declines (in magnitude) from

-$30,500 to -$24,500. In Model 4, we add controls for the mother’s education and the only
statistically significant difference is for those who experience dissolution and do not

remarry. The estimated difference remains around -$24,200. The never married difference

drops in magnitude to -$10,900, and the difference for the married after birth group falls to
-$12,400. When we include the education variable as a mechanism to explain potential
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impact of family structure in Model 5, the difference for the never married group declines
(in magnitude) again to -$4,300, the difference for the married after birth declines (in

magnitude) to -$10,200, the difference for the remarried group increases to $5,041, and the
difference for the never remarried group declines (in magnitude) about a third to -$16,900.
This final difference is the only difference that is statistically significant. In Model 6, we add
a measure of the permanent income of the child, which would capture all of the

socioeconomic factors related to family structure outside of human capital accumulation.
Once controlled, the coefficient estimate for dissolution and never remarrying falls (in
magnitude) to -$9,500 but remains statistically significant.

We next turn to results from the family fixed effects models (FE) to test the

robustness of our OLS findings. It is important to restate that the identification of the family
structure coefficients in our family fixed effect model comes from variation among siblings
that experienced different family structures during their first ten years. In our analytic
sample, we had 369 families with siblings which translated into 822 individual

observations. However, most of the siblings did not experience a different family structure
during their first ten years. Table 9 provides more detail on family structure variation

within siblings. The first row in Table 9 shows that four two-sibling families (eight siblings)

and two three-sibling families (six siblings) had variation in the “never-married” family
structure. Based on Table 9, there is very little family structure variation to identify the

difference in economic wellbeing for the children of never-married mothers and those who
were always married (n=14). The same is true of the mothers who remarry after divorce.
While none of the family structure types had a considerable amount of within sibling

variation, the married after birth and the dissolution and never remarried groups appear to
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have relatively more. We focus our attention on the results for the dissolved and never

remarried group since these are the results that were statistically significant in the OLS

models, but again, we simply report these results as robustness checks to compare to the
OLS results.

Table 10 reports results for the child’s educational attainment, and Tables 13 and 14

show results from the family income and family income adjusted for family size,

respectively. In Table 10, we report the OLS findings from Models 4 and 5 in Table 6, in

addition to the results for the family fixed effects (FE) models. As expected, the coefficient
estimates for the family fixed effects models are imprecisely measured. However, the

point-estimates are quite consistent for the dissolved and never remarried group in the
OLS and fixed effects models. For instance, in Model 4, compared to those who are

constantly married, the children of mothers who experience a marital dissolution without

remarriage earn about 0.72 of a year less education. The point-estimate for the fixed effects
models is 0.75 years less. Similarly, in Model 5, once the child’s permanent income during
childhood is controlled, the point estimate in the OLS model is -0.54 compared to -0.59 in

the fixed effects model.

Model 5 in Table 11 shows a difference for marital dissolution and never remarrying

of around -$16,500 for both the OLS model and the FE model. The results for Model 6 are

less consistent, showing greater disparity in the FE model compared to the OLS model, but
both the FE results suggest that the difference may be even larger than predicted by the

OLS results. The results for family income adjusted for size are qualitatively similar, and are
reported in Table 12.
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Discussion and Conclusion
Until recently, data have not been available to investigate the long-term consequences of

single parenthood for children once they reach adulthood. We use the PSID to determine
whether the marital status of mothers during the first ten years of a child’s life affect that

child’s economic well-being both in childhood and adulthood. Our results suggest the

economic wellbeing of children who experience a maternal dissolution differs depending
on the whether the mother remarries. More specifically, the children whose mothers

remarry appear to have, as a child, family incomes that are quite similar to the children
who live with continuously married mothers. Children of mothers who never remarry

appear to suffer economically. In fact, our results suggest that the children of continuously
married mothers and mothers who remarry have an improved economic situation

throughout their youth. In contrast, the children of mothers who do not remarry not only

have worse economic conditions at birth compared to the children of continuously married
parents, their economic wellbeing actually declines over time. In other words, they are
become worse off as they age. This finding is interesting in the context of the broader

literature. Duncan and Hoffman (1985) showed that marital dissolution is more harmful to
women than men and that remarriage can protect women. We find that this is particularly
true for women with children and when one looks at their smoothed income rather than

just looking at individual years. Of course, one cannot be sure this difference among those
who experience a dissolution is a remarriage effect. Mothers who experience a dissolution
and remarry may be different from mothers who do not remarry in ways that we have not
controlled. What this does suggest, however, is that dissolution, in and of itself, is not
harmful to children.
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If this remarriage difference is causal, the finding is of value to the broader

literature on remarriage. Children who grow up with mothers who divorce and remarry do
not fare as well on a variety of outcomes, including educational attainment and engaging in
risky behaviors, on average as children who grow up with continuously married parents
(Astone and McLanahan 1991; Coleman, Ganong, and Fine 2000; Hoffman and Johnson

1998; Ribar 2004; Teachman Paasch, and Carver 1996). Our results suggest that these

losses are probably not due to a reduction in parental resources: remarried families seem

to have at least as much income as continuously married families, perhaps even more. One
potential explanation for the poorer outcomes for the children of remarriage is the

instability of a marital dissolution, where children may have to move into a different

neighborhood with different peer networks and schools. Furthermore, the children may

suffer from the stress of the break-up. Ribar (2004) also suggests that step-parents may not
place the same value on their step-children, and invest in them less.

Our findings also suggest that some of the difference persist into adulthood, but only

for those who experience dissolution without remarriage; the children of remarriage have

education and income levels that are comparable to the children of mothers who were
always married. The children of mothers who experience a dissolution but who do not

remarry earn about 0.7 less years of education. Once we control for the permanent income
of the family during the child’s first ten years, the difference falls to 0.5 years, but remains

statistically significant. Thus, the family structure differences may be partially explained by
their economic well-being as a child, but other explanations must exist. Given that the
children of remarriage had much smaller reductions in education (0.09 years and

insignificant), then the common experiences with the children of remarriage, such as a
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break-up with a biological parent, also are probably not the explanation for the observed
differences. Dissolution, in and of itself, then is probably not the source of the difference

either, and selection remains a likely cause. We use family fixed effects models to check the
robustness of our findings, and they are consistent with the 0.7 to 0.5 year reduction in

education. If selection is the issue, then it is likely factors that are not constant within the
family.

With respect to income as an adult, the findings for the children of mothers who

experience dissolution also diverge conditional on a remarriage. The children of mothers
who remarry, appear to earn at least as much as the children of continuously married

mothers. Without remarriage, the children who experience dissolution earn about $17,000
less annually in adulthood. Family fixed effects models show nearly identical results. Once
we control for the permanent income of the child during their first ten years, dissolution

without remarriage becomes less costly. The difference falls to around $9,500 suggesting

that parental income as a child may have persistent effects. The family fixed effects model
show much larger differences, but they are not precisely measured.

Our results show that family structure does appear to matter to the economic well-

being of children – both when growing up and as adults. Moreover, they suggest that

dissolution in particular has the potential to be harmful. However, there is considerable
heterogeneity in the effects of dissolution among these children. For example, children

whose mothers remarry appear to experience relatively minimal impacts of their mother’s
marital dissolution. Those whose mothers do not remarry appear to have large reductions
in their economic wellbeing in childhood and a an adult.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Mothers and Children
Family Income: Mean
Family Income: [Median]
Family Income: (Standard
Deviation)
Family Income Adjusted for
Family Size
Age

Always married
Never married
Married after birth
Marital Dissolution
Never remarried
Remarried
Female
African American
White
Other

Parent’s Generation
60315
[54870]
(33844)
29684
[27269]
(16396)
29.86
(5.38)
0.801
0.034
0.051
0.114
0.077
0.037

Child’s Generation
81256
[69102]
(66789)
50630
[42124]
(42040)
31.75
(3.37)

0.496
0.136
0.837
0.028

Sample Size
1548
Note: Authors’ calculations from the PSID. Incomes are inflated to 2008 dollars using the
CPI-U-RS and CPI-U-X1.
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Table 2: Total Family Income and Total Family Income Adjusted for Family Size for
Parent and Children

Family income
(mother)

Adjusted family
income
(mother)
Family income
(child)
Adjusted family
income (child)

Child female
Child African
American
Child White
Child other race
Mother’s age
Child’s age

Mother < HS
Mother HS
Mother Some
College
Mother College
Grad +
Child < HS
Child HS
Child Some
College
Child College
Grad +

Full
Sample

Always
Married

Never
Married

Married
After Birth

0.172
0.032
26.45
(6.01)
30.69
(3.31)
0.575
0.274
0.124

0.482
0.090
25.02
(4.18)
31.34
(3.62)
0.328
0.524
0.132

60315
[54870]
(33844)
29684
[27269]
(16396)
81256
[69102]
(66789)
50630
[42124]
(42040)
0.496
0.136

64748
[58684]
(33424)
31558
[28893]
(16172)
86886
[73594]
(69829)
53880
[44638]
(43920)
0.479
0.081

21577
[16961]
(14809)
10870
[8932]
(7053)
41195
[32633]
(33232)
25593
[18442]
(22943)
0.607
0.796

0.153

0.162

0.026

0.837
0.028
29.86
(5.38)
31.75
(3.37)
0.154
0.443
0.250
0.100
0.255
0.312
0.333

0.893
0.025
30.35
(5.22)
31.88
(3.37)
0.126
0.456
0.256
0.092
0.224
0.319
0.366

0.285
0.410
0.178
0.127

37322
[31028]
(21002)
19050
[17036]
(11304)
52381
[45371]
(49195)
31413
[29932]
(28990)
0.486
0.428

Marital
Dissolution:
Remarried
60711
[50204]
(37679)
33439
[27311]
(20475)
88092
[70826]
(64463)
56953
[42161]
(40814)
0.650
0.095

Marital
Dissolution: Never
Remarried
46421
[40350]
(28244)
23769
[21495]
(12632)
56352
[51472]
(32099)
37647
[33953]
(22980)
0.546
0.238

0.017

0.197

0.180

0.138
0.384
0.346
0.131

0.905
0
28.38
(4.36)
31.38
(3.04)
0.042
0.411
0.350
0.033
0.358
0.254
0.355

0.738
0.025
30.21
(5.67)
31.29
(3.35)
0.208
0.341
0.271
0.102
0.379
0.304
0.215

Sample size
1548
1129
113
126
54
126
Note: Authors’ calculations from the PSID. Incomes are inflated to 2008 dollars using the CPI-U-RS and CPI-UX1.
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Table 3: OLS Models of Family Structure and Family Income during Child’s Youth
Single parent

Never married

Model 1
-22226**
(2703)

Married after birth

Marital dissolution
& remarried
Marital dissolution
& never remarried
Constant

64748**
(1424)
No
No

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-43170**
(2761)
-27426**
(3347)
-4037
(6394)
-18327**
(4105)
64748**
(1426)
No
No

-21212**
(3860)
-7552*
(3248)
833
(6142)
-15490**
(3233)
62585**
(1235)
Yes
No

-16125**
(3430)
-5665
(3136)
-3111
(5503)
-15424**
(3117)
62457**
(1177)
Yes
Yes

Demo.
Mother’s
Education
Sample size
1548
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models
include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a
linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was measured, and a
measure of the mother’s age when she had her first child. Mother’s education includes a set
of indicators for less than high school, high school, some college. College or more is omitted
category.
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Table 4: OLS Models of Family Structure and Family Income Adjusted
for Family Size during Child’s Youth
Single parent

Never
married
Married after
birth
Marital
dissolution &
remarried
Marital
dissolution &
never
remarried
Constant

Model 1
-9394**
(1366)

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-20688**
(1362)
-12508**
(1847)
1881
(3567)

-9565**
(1880)
-3338*
(1642)
4236
(3571)

-7005**
(1718)
-2399
(1573)
2250
(3155)

31558**
(684)
No
No

30501**
(593)
Yes
No

30438**
(563)
Yes
Yes

-7789**
(1786)

31558**
(684)
No
No

-6204**
(1341)

-6171**
(1258)

Demo.
Mother’s
Education
Sample size
1548
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family
level. Models include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s
race. The models also include a linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s
mean age when income was measured, and a measure of the mother’s age
when she had her first child. Mother’s education includes a set of indicators
for less than high school, high school, some college. College or more is
omitted category.
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Table 5: Difference Model of Family Income Before and After Marital Dissolution,
Sample of Mothers Married when Child Born

Always married

Dissolution and remarried

Dissolution and never remarried

Sample Includes Continuously Married Mothers
Family Income
Adjusted Family Income
12324**
(1009)
21080**
(6996)

-13537**##
(3577)

4184**
(465)
11890**#
(3814)

-4811**##
(1432)

1276
1276
Sample size
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01 for H0: Parameter = 0;
# p<0.05; ## p < 0.01 for H0: Parameter different from Always Married Parameter;
Robust standard errors clustered at family level.
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Table 6: OLS Models of Family Structure and Child’s Educational
Attainment
Single
parent
Never
married
Married
after birth
Marital
dissolution
&
remarried
Marital
dissolution
& never
remarried
Constant

Model 1
-0.828**
(0.178)

14.01**
(0.086)
No
No

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-1.601**
(0.343)
-1.120**
(0.298)
0.078
(0.354)

-1.071**
(0.393)
-0.414
(0.300)
0.181
(0.318)

-0.657
(0.415)
-0.257
(0.282)
-0.126
(0.303)

-0.471
(0.409)
-0.191
(0.279)
-0.089
(0.293)

-0.731**
(0.269)

-0.726**
(0.247)

-0.719**
(0.210)

-0.543**
(0.213)

14.01**
(0.086)
No
No

13.95**
(0.078)
Yes
No

13.94**
(0.075)
Yes
Yes

13.91**
(0.074)
Yes
Yes

Demo.
Mother’s
Education
Mother’s
No
No
No
No
Yes
Permanent
Income
Sample
1548
size
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level.
Models include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The
models also include a linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age
when income was measured, a linear and quadratic term for the child’s age
when education was measured, and a measure of the mother’s age when she
had her first child. Mother’s education includes a set of indicators for less
than high school, high school, some college. College or more is omitted
category.
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Table 7: OLS Models of Family Structure and Child’s Family Income during
Adulthood
Single parent

Never married

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

86886**
(2746)
No
No
No
No

-45961**
(6756)
-34506**
(7399)
1205
(11249)
-30534**
(4686)
86886**
(2749)
No
No
No
No

-16905*
(8154)
-14587
(8200)
6056
(10939)
-24501**
(4515)
84244**
(2446)
Yes
No
No
No

-10923
(7790)
-12361
(8068)
2075
(10886)
-24175**
(4407)
84050**
(2426)
Yes
Yes
No
No

-4347
(7728)
-10204
(7679)
5041
(11316)
-16925**
(4117)
83047**
(2207)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

3714
(8191)
-7300
(7313)
6544
(11333)
-9461*
(4772)
81993**
(2012)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-28228**
(4374)

Married after birth

Marital dissolution
& remarried
Marital dissolution
& never remarried
Constant

Demo.
Mother’s Education
Child’s Education
Mother’s
Permanent Income
1548
Sample size
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models include
indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a linear and
quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was measured, a linear and quadratic
term for the child’s age when the child’s total family income was measured, and a measure of
the mother’s age when she had her first child. Mother’s education includes a set of indicators for
less than high school, high school, some college. College or more is omitted category. The child’s
education includes the same education categories.
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Table 8: OLS Models of Family Structure and Child’s Family
Income Adjusted for Family Size during Adulthood
Single parent

Never
married
Married after
birth
Marital
dissolution &
remarried
Marital
dissolution &
never
remarried
Constant

Demo.
Mother’s
Education
Child’s
Education
Mother’s
Permanent
Income
Sample Size

Model 1
-16294**
(2877)

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

-28287**
(4737)
-22467**
(4437)
3073
(7788)

-10395
(5503)
-9883*
(4973)
7412
(7957)

-6628
(5247)
-8343
(4881)
4533
(7559)

-2402
(5095)
-6836
(4583)
6493
(7781)

2278
(5269)
-5150
(4341)
7366
(7518)

-16233**
(3271)

-12672**
(3156)

-12658**
(3025)

-7711**
(2651)

53880**
(1703)
No
No

53880**
(1705)
No
No

52193**
(1501)
Yes
No

52092**
(1495)
Yes
Yes

51417**
(1346)
Yes
Yes

50806**
(1257)
Yes
Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

1548

No

Yes

-3377
(2875)

Yes

Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models
include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also
include a linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was
measured, a linear and quadratic term for the child’s age when the child’s total family
income was measured, and a measure of the mother’s age when she had her first
child. Mother’s education includes a set of indicators for less than high school, high
school, some college. College or more is omitted category. The child’s education
includes the same education categories.
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Table 9: Sample Size for Families with Siblings and for Families with Siblings
with Variation by Family Structure
Observations: Families with Family
Structure Variation
Never married
Married after birth
Divorced and remarried
Divorced and never remarried
Total
Total Number of Families
Total in Sample

Two
8
36
12
38
94

586

Number of Siblings in the Family
Three

Four

Five

Total

207

24

5

822

6
18
9
12
45

0
4
0
4
8

0
0
0
0
0

14
58
21
54
147
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Table 10: Comparison of OLS and Mother Fixed Effects Models, Child’s Educational
Attainment

Never married

Married after birth

Marital dissolution &
remarried
Marital dissolution &
never remarried
Demographics
Mother’s permanent
income
Sample Size

OLS
-0.657
(0.415)
-0.257
(0.282)
-0.126
(0.303)
-0.719**
(0.210)
Yes
No

1548

Model 4

FE
-0.460
(0.850)
0.255
(0.590)
0.120
(0.981)
-0.754
(0.879)

OLS
-0.471
(0.409)
-0.191
(0.279)
-0.089
(0.293)
-0.543**
(0.213)

822

1548

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Model 5

FE
-0.269
(0.820)
0.219
(0.595)
0.325
(1.007)
-0.592
(0.855)
Yes
Yes

822

Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models
include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a
linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was measured, a linear
and quadratic term for the child’s age when the child’s education was measured, and a
measure of the mother’s age when she had her first child. Mother’s education includes a set
of indicators for less than high school, high school, some college. College or more is omitted
category.
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Table 11: Comparison of OLS Models and Mother Fixed Effects Models of Child’s
Family Income during Adulthood

Never married

Married after birth

Marital dissolution & remarried

Marital dissolution & never remarried
Demographics
Child’s Education
Mother’s permanent income
Sample Size

Model 5
OLS
-4347
(7728)
-10204
(7679)
5041
(11316)
-16925**
(4117)
Yes
Yes
No
1550

FE
-36880
(20699)
-12505
(9562)
15724
(26060)
-16386
(20091)
Yes
Yes
No
822

Model 6
OLS
FE
-40643*
3714
(19450)
(8191)
-11764
-7300
(9683)
(7313)
11286
6544
(25319)
(11333)
-19548
-9461*
(19208)
(4772)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1550

Yes
Yes
Yes
822

Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models include indicator
variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a linear and quadratic terms for the
mother’s mean age when income was measured, a linear and quadratic term for the child’s age when the
child’s total family income was measured, and a measure of the mother’s age when she had her first child.
Mother’s education includes a set of indicators for less than high school, high school, some college. College or
more is omitted category. The child’s education includes the same categories.
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Table 12: Comparison of OLS Models and Mother Fixed Effects Models of Child’s
Family Income Adjusted for Family Size

Never married

Married after birth

Marital dissolution &
remarried
Marital dissolution & never
remarried

Demographics
Child’s Education
Mother’s permanent income
Sample Size

OLS
-2402
(5095)
-6836
(4583)
6493
(7781)
-7711**
(2651)
Yes
Yes
No
1548

Model 6

FE

-30190**
(11513)
-5961
(5515)

11081
(12670)
-9679
(10530)

Yes
Yes
No
822

OLS
2278
(5269)
-5150
(4341)
7366
(7518)
-3377
(2875)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1548

Model 7

FE

-30673**
(11040)
-5894
(5535)

10334
(12401)
-10237
(10096)

Yes
Yes
Yes
822

Notes: * p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors clustered at family level. Models
include indicator variables for the child’s sex and the child’s race. The models also include a
linear and quadratic terms for the mother’s mean age when income was measured, a linear
and quadratic term for the child’s age when the child’s total family income was measured,
and a measure of the mother’s age when she had her first child. Mother’s education
includes a set of indicators for less than high school, high school, some college. College or
more is omitted category. The child’s education includes the same categories.
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Data Appendix
The 1,548 cases that were included in the PSID analytic sample met some fairly rigid data
requirements. The child’s mother’s marital history needed to be complete for the child’s
first ten years, the child needed at least three years of total family income reported
between 2000 and 2008, and the child’s mother needed at least three years of total family
income reported during the child’s first ten years. The variable for the child’s family size
during his/her youth and during his/her adulthood also had to be non-missing in the years
income was reported. Furthermore, the child’s education variable between 2000 and 2008
had to be non-missing for at least one year. Given these selection criteria, the 1,548
children used in the analytic sample is much smaller than the full sample of children born
between 1967 and 1978. Below, we compare the demographic characteristics (that were
never missing) for the 1,548 child used in the analysis to the 2,217 children born between
1967 and 1978 who had individual sample weights, i.e., the full sample of children in the
PSID who could have been used with complete data.
Child is female

Child is African
American
Child is white

Child is other race
Year born

Analytic Sample
0.496
(0.500)
0.136
(0.342)
0.837
(0.370)
0.028
(0.164)
1972.33
(3.46)

Full Sample
0.476
(0.500)
0.149
(0.356)
0.824
(0.380)
0.027
(0.161)
1972.55
(3.51)

Cases not used
0.417**
(0.493)
0.192**
(0.394)
0.785**
(0.411)
0.023
(0.151)
1973.20**
(3.58)

1548
2217
669
Notes: ** p < 0.01; t-test for difference between proportion in analytic sample and
proportion among cases not used in the analysis.

Results suggest that the cases that were lost for this analysis were not random. The
individuals lost to this analysis were less likely to be female, were more likely to be African
American, and were slightly younger than those in the analytic sample. Readers should
keep this in mind when interpreting results.

